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Abstract
We address the closely related phenomena of corporate venturing and
spin-offs in the context of organizational economics, for example,
agency perspectives and the evolutionary perspective on firms. These
perspectives allow us to say something about both the amount and
nature of variety creation inside firms.  For example, there are strong
arguments that firms will tend to produce too few and too “narrow”
venture ideas. Moreover, organizational economics is helpful in
deriving propositions about the occurrence of spin-offs, which we
separate into “vicious” and “virtuous” ones. The former type refers to
ventures that could have helped bringing corporate renewal, but where
overruled venture managers left the firm in frustration. The latter type
refers to ventures that are too far away from the firm’s core business(es)
to assist in corporate renewal, but where their spin-off is tantamount to
a learning experience to the firm.
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I. Introduction
Many scholars have emphasized the importance of internal corporate venturing
for corporate renewal and for shaking up “core rigidities” (Burgelman, 1983;
Leonard-Barton, 1992).  However, it is a quite common phenomenon that many
venture ideas are either killed by higher-level management, or, if the ideas are
allowed to blossom, are followed by spin-offs. In both cases, corporate renewal
may be jeopardized.
In this paper, we address the relations between internal corporate
venturing, spin-offs and corporate renewal. In particular, we will be taken up
with discussing under which circumstances spin-offs are “virtuous” in the
sense that they assist, or at least do not harm, corporate renewal, and under
which circumstances they actually harm corporate renewal, that is, are
“vicious”.
Spin-offs are normally defined as an individual or an organizational unit
leaving an existing firm to start as a new firm on the basis of his/her
knowledge and competences. While much may be said in favor of spin-offs on
the societal level as they help disseminate knowledge and in general promote
technological dynamism1, to the individual firm confronting a potential spin-
off, the situation may be different.
                    
1 Historically, numerous large firms have grown from small spin-offs and the importance of
spin-offs to technologically progressive regions such as Silicon Valley or Route 128 is generally
recognized.
2For example, spin-offs may be the result of lack of internal support and
approval to pursue the perceived opportunity - a lack of support and approval
that may produce a number of harmful effects, such as the inability to update
resources and capabilities through effective venturing and a general negative
effect on the entrepreneurial climate in the organization.  However, spin-offs
may also have beneficial effects (Ito, 1995; McGrath, 1995). Thus, a spin-off of
internal ventures (e.g., by management buy-out) may provide the firm with a
learning experience about its strategic capabilities, it may help keeping the firm
focused on its core business, or it may help creating a powerful incentive for
intrapreneurs to seek and exploit productive opportunities.2
Despite some similarities between the two types of spin-offs  - for
example, both reduce intra-firm diversity - they play quite different roles in the
internal corporate venturing process and have different implications for
corporate renewal. The interplay between corporate venturing, spin-offs and
corporate renewal need to be investigated in more detail.
For that purpose, we rely on arguments from organizational economics.
We emphasize that we do not offer a finely honed theory, but an explorative
discussion that rely on organizational economics arguments for pragmatic
reasons. We follow Barney and Ouchi (1986) and think of organizational
economics as composed of a diversity of streams of thought on economic
organization. Among these are agency theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Holmström, 1982, 1989; Jones and Butler, 1992; Aghion and Tirole, 1997),
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1996), incomplete contracts theory (Hart, 1995),
                    
2 This virtuous character is, however, controversial. For example, in Hoskisson et al. (1994)
spin-offs and management buy-out are treated as the result of mistakes, due to inadequate
strategies and inappropriate governance structures. In addition, according to Burgelman (1983,
1991) successful internal ventures play a crucial role in changing the strategic direction of the
firm and thereby adapting itself to the new environmental conditions. In a similar vein
Leonard-Barton (1992) has argued that successful internal ventures are agents for renewal.
Obviously, when these successful ventures are spun off, they can play no role as change agent.
3evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), team-theory about information
structures (Sah and Stiglitz, 1985; Sah, 1991), and the resource-based approach
(Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972; Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1987, 1995; Foss,
1997a).
This is admittedly a broad menu of perspectives.3 However, what is
important in the present connection is that they all capture aspects of the firm,
and  that they are helpful in connection with understanding spin-offs.4 In an
explanatory sense, the relevant perspectives are therefore complementary; we
obtain additional knowledge of corporate venturing, spin-offs, etc. when we
examine them with the lens provided by each of the different perspectives.
Thus, as we will argue, a conceptualization of the firm as, for example, a nexus
of contracts that embodies property rights and incentives is helpful for
understanding spin-offs; thus, some agency costs may be reduced by a spin-off,
because management no longer have to control activities with which they are
basically unfamiliar. However, a conceptualization of the firm that emphasizes
resources and capabilities and views the firm as a learning entity may certainly
also be helpful.  In this perspective, spin-offs may be beneficial, for example,
because incorporating new unrelated ventures in the corporate portfolio would
stretch learning domains too much.
The design of the paper is the following. We begin by briefly discussing
the literature on internal corporate venturing, and make the point that spin-offs
                    
3 And the menu could be even broader. For internal corporate venturing and spin-offs are
issues that relate intimately to the debate (in both economics and management studies) on the
innovative potential of small versus large firms, to technology strategy, and to the theory of
real options. Since we do not want to further complicate an already complicated issue, we
abstain from drawing on these streams of thought, however.
4 For the more ambitious argument that these theories are generally helpful in the context of
theorizing corporate strategy, see Mahoney (1992) and Seth and Thomas (1994).  For inquiries
into the relations between these diverse perspectives, see Fransman (1994) and Foss (1997c).
For contributions that also apply to both resource-based/evolutionary perspectives and
transaction cost/agency perspectives, see Rumelt (1987, 1995) and Teece et al. (1994).
4are often outcomes of the internal corporate venturing process. In fact, spin-offs
may be seen as failures of the venturing process (Section II, “Internal Corporate
Venturing and Spin-Offs: The Context”). These failures are, of course, failures of
the parent company - they may be seen as missed opportunities or inability to
develop sufficient exploratory search routines looking for possibilities to renew
the capabilities of the firm.
Thus, the study of spin-offs as special cases of internal corporate
venturing is intimately related to the key strategic management issue of
corporate renewal. In order to arrive at a fuller understanding of internal
corporate venturing and spin-offs, we place these phenomena in the context of
organizational economics (Section III, “Internal Corporate Venturing: Perspectives
From Organizational Economics”, Section IV, “Implications for Spin-Offs”), and
derive a number of propositions about these phenomena. For example, we
argue that there may be an inherent conservative bias in many organizations,
particularly strongly hierarchical ones, that operates against new venture ideas.
II.  Internal Corporate Venturing and Spin-Offs:
The Context
A. Exploration and Exploitation
A first convenient perspective on internal corporate ventures and spin-offs is to
situate these phenomena in the context of 1) the variation-retention-selection
scheme associated with evolutionary economics and organizational ecology
perspectives (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Marengo, 1995; Levinthal, 1995), and 2)
the exploitation-exploration trade-off investigated by Penrose (1959),
5Wernerfelt (1984) and March (1991). The variation-retention-selection scheme
and the exploitation-exploration trade-off are closely related ideas.
In this context, corporate venturing is an aspect of firm-specific variety
creation, and spin-offs may be seen as one result of the operation of the firm-
specific selection mechanism.5  The process of creation of variation and the later
selection among this variation is, in the context of the theory of the firm,
increasingly often related to the exploration/exploitation trade-off. This is the
idea that a key corporate level strategic challenge concerns the search for a
proper balance between the exploitation of existing resources and exploration,
that is, the sort of experimenting that may lead to the creation of new skills,
capabilities, resources, and products.
Although both are needed for long-term survival, exploitation is more
short-term and oriented to improve current operating efficiency, while explora-
tion is aimed at finding new sources for growth. March (1991) stresses the
necessity of balancing these, and implicitly assumes that exploitative and
explorative efforts may go on simultaneously within a firm. However, others
have emphasized the difficulty of combining them, and have concluded that
they are in reality mutually exclusive (e.g., Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa, 1993).
Essentially, this is because each mode requires the development of specific and
distinct capabilities, commitments, modes of cognition and incentives. In this
context, the problem is not so much a matter of balancing both modes, but more
of how to change from one mode to another, for example, when the industry
product/process life cycle moves from its “fluid” to its “mature” phase.
Quite a number of scholars have examined how firms have reconciled
these conflicting orientations (e.g., Volberda, 1996; Volberda and Baden-Fuller,
1996), how they have moved from one orientation to another (Baden-Fuller and
                    
5  Herbert Simon (1962)  first suggested that  these evolutionary mechanisms can be taken
inside organizations, as it were.
6Stopford, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1992), and what are the drivers for firms to
change the relative importance of each of those two orientations. Concepts from
the corporate entrepreneurship and renewal literature have been helpful in
improving our understanding of these questions. In particular, research on
internal corporate venturing and strategic alliances have given some insight
into ways of dealing with the paradoxical demands of maintaining and rene-
wing the distinctive capabilities. Thus, Leonard-Barton (1992) has shown how
ventures can function as agents for renewal, and Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller
(1995) provide evidence that capabilities derived from strategic alliances may
help renewing the core capabilities of the firm.
B. Spin-offs and Corporate Venturing: A Framework
In order to examine the role of spin-offs in the internal corporate venturing
process Elfring, Meeusen-Henniger and Volberda (1996) developed a
framework for analyzing the venturing process. It is characterized by three
features.
First, ventures are assumed to be how somewhat separated from the
main line of business,6 where the degree of separation differs from totally
independent skunkworks to projects which are headed by line managers. A key
issue is the degree of autonomy of the venture. Some claim that they should
have substantial autonomy, while others have suggested that failures can be
linked to too much autonomy (e.g., Venkataraman, 1992).
Second, three levels of management are distinguished. Besides top
management and the management of the business units it is important to recog-
nize the level of venture managers. Each has a particular role and responsibility
                                                            
6 In reality, this is not necessarily the case, but making the assumption allows to highlight
problems that would not exist under less extreme assumptions.
7and it is difficult to discuss only one, because they are strongly interrelated.
Quite different views about the role of the various levels of management are
put forward in the literature, and we will also contribute an opinion here.  For
example, we will argue that how the process of rejection or approval of venture
projects is actually organized influences the rejection/approval rate.
The third feature is the recognition of three stages, namely an idea
generation stage, a selection stage and a consolidation stage. In the idea generating
stage, it is important that there is sufficient exposure to other environments,
such as scientific, technological or market fields that are new to the firm.
Venturing begins with the activation of some person or persons to sense or
seize new opportunities (Kanter, 1990) . The individual willingness to exercise
alertness (Kirzner, 1973) to perceived opportunities depends to some extent on
the willingness of the firm to support such a potential venture. (In fact, we will
take it as a basic assumption that the more often venture managers are
overruled by higher-level management, the weaker their incentives to engage
in explorative efforts).  At this point the selection of venture proposals is of
importance, and we will identify a number of mechanisms that underlie and
influence this process. Finally, new venture ideas that have survived the
internal selection mechanisms are candidates for acting as agents of renewal
through being integrated with the firm’s existing operations. Spin-offs may,
however, also take place during this consolidation phase.
There can be three outcomes of the internal corporate venturing process.
One outcome is a failure to turn the perceived opportunity into a profitable
business proposal. The second possibility is the success of the venture, as
measured by its profitability and growth potential. In this case, the integration
of the venture organization into the main line of business is the main concern.
The third potential outcome of the venturing process is a spin-off, which, as we
will argue, can be either virtuous or vicious to the firm.
8C.Types of Spin-Offs
As explained earlier, a spin-off can be an individual or an organizational unit
leaving an existing firm to start as a new firm on the basis of his/her
knowledge and competences. This definition thus includes both individuals
breaking away from existing companies to create their own business and the
divestiture of a business unit, support activity or project group. We deal with
both cases in the following.
An obvious key question is, Why would individuals leave relatively
secure positions in established firms in order to run their own, normally rather
risky, start-up company? The two most common explanations appear to be
frustration with one’s present employer and the perception that greater
financial rewards can be earned by running one’s own company (Garvin, 1983).
This type of spin-off can thus be seen as a failure from the point of view of the
parent company.  The parent company for some reason or another was not able
or willing to exploit the opportunities perceived by an intrapreneur.
The second category of spin-offs relates to an organizational unit instead
of to an individual.  This type of spin-off is usually seen as more favorable as,
in most cases, it does not compete with the firm it originated from.  This
category may again be sub-divided into two distinct groups.  One group
concerns internal units that produce goods and services for internal use.
Empirically, quite a number of these internal units have gone through a
gradual process to become more autonomous, and some have also taken the
final step and have been spun off.  The other group includes successful
ventures which are divested by the parent company because the latter wishes to
9concentrate on its core business, or perhaps because the firm may not control
the complementary assets that are necessary to bring the fruits of the venture to
the market (Richardson, 1972; Teece, 1986).
Because the venture is successful, but the firm has a parenting
disadvantage in managing it (cf. Goold and Campbell, 1987), the venture has a
higher market value (value to another firm or stand-alone value) than the value
it has to the firm. In some cases, it may be preferred to maintain some kind of
relationship between the parent company and the shedded unit, for example a
minority ownership by the parent company (Ito, 1995).
These two latter two types of spin-off can be beneficial to the original
firm and can therefore be labeled as “virtuous” spin-offs, quite in contrast to the
first category, which will be referred to as “vicious” spin-offs.
The trouble with the existing literature is that there is 1) a lack of ability
to consistently distinguish between virtuous and vicious spin-offs, and 2) that
work on corporate venturing has not been extensively tied to the spin-off
phenomenon.  As a result, it is hard, from existing perspectives, to address and
satisfactorily answer questions such as, What insights can spin-offs give with
regard to which venture strategies are the proper ones? Do these strategies
provide sufficient possibilities to reduce the number of vicious spin-offs and
account for virtuous spin-offs? Etc.
However, in the 1990s a number of studies (Burgelman, 1991; Galunic
and Eisenhardt, 1996; Miner, 1994) appeared on the development of
intraorganizational phenomena from a population ecology point of view -
studies that at least have the potential of addressing these questions. Instead of
taking a population of firms as the level of analysis, these studies focus on a
population of internal initiatives, and conceptualize changes in such a
population as a result of the interplay of various mechanisms of evolutionary
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change, such as variety, heredity/retention and selection. In such studies, the
units of analysis have been tailored to this approach.7 These studies signal the
emergence of a viable intraorganizational ecology tradition. It is a novel and
interesting use of the ecological perspective, and we will refer to this
perspective, too, to frame our analysis of corporate venturing and spin-offs.
III. Internal Corporate Venturing:
Perspectives From Organizational Economics
Long-run survival and growth requires that the firm is able to update and
expand its  productive opportunity, that is, “...all of the productive possibilities
that [the firm’s]entrepreneurs see and can take advantage of” (Penrose, 1959:
31). It is a shared conviction in a large and heterogeneous literature (e.g.,
Penrose, 1959; Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa, 1993; Levinthal,  1995; Marengo,
1995) that accomplishing this requires that the firm controls two basic
organizational capabilities, namely an adequate variation generating
mechanism, and a selection mechanism that select adequately among  different
ventures.
We want to add a third capability: the capability required to secure a steady
availability of intrapreneurs motivated to “champion” ventures. The venturing
process is highly dependent on individuals who want to take risks and have
the stamina to explore new possibilities. In much of the literature on venturing
and renewal, the availability of these individuals is essentially taken for
granted.   But clearly, this assumption is not warranted in general, and it is
desirable to make the availability of intrapreneurs endogenous to the analysis.
                    
7 For example, in Burgelman (1991) the unit of analysis was the internal corporate venture,
and in Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996) it was “charter losses”.
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In fact, the very existence of vicious spin-offs is a signal that entrepreneurs are
leaving the firm. It takes a deliberate policy of providing sufficient incentives to
be attractive for entrepreneurs. Virtuous spin-offs may be an incentive
instrument that can foster such a policy. Further research is needed to detect
the underlying mechanisms.
In this section, we address internal corporate ventures and spin-offs in
the disciplinary context of organizational economics and in the specific context
of the Elfring, Meeusen-Henniger and Volberda (1996) framework that was
described in section II.B.
A. Overall Perspective
In order to throw light on the phenomena of corporate venturing and spin-offs,
we begin by adopting a basic resource-based perspective on the firm. Thus,
firms are seen as bundles of heterogeneous resources, particularly knowledge
resources (e.g., capabilities), that are operated by a management team for a
strategic purpose (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1987; Foss, 1997a). In this context, a
spin-off can be translated into a reduction of the corporate resources and
capabilities portfolio, perhaps because the resources and capabilities
underlying the venture that is being spun off are thought to be too “dissimilar”
(Richardson, 1972) relative to the firm’s core resources and capabilities, and
therefore too hard to manage. Conversely, one of the objectives of corporate
venturing is the extension of the frontiers of corporate capabilities - that is, the
creation of new resources - by providing means and incentives for a process in
which members of an existing firm bring into existence products and markets
which do not currently exist within the repertoire of the firm (Venkataraman,
1992). Thus, corporate venturing is clearly an explorative and experimenting
process - but it is still a process that takes place within an organizational
                                                            
12
context consisting of firm-specific information structures, norms, and
incentives.8
In fact, as we argue later in more detail, the importance of this context
derives from the fact that it both co-determines the generation of new corporate
venturing and helps selecting among new ventures.  In order to understand
this process, we will draw on both ideas from evolutionary economics and
population ecology, such as the scheme of variation-selection-retention, and on
transaction cost and agency theory perspectives.  The table below summarizes
our overall perspective.
______________________________________________________________________
Conceptualization of Corresponding theory Relevance for corp.
the firm venturing/spin-offs 
(examples)
______________________________________________________________________
Bundle of resources Resource-based persp. Are the resources 
underlying the venture 
related to the existing 
resource portfolio? 
Will they help us achieve 
sustainedcompetitive 
advantage?
Learning entity Evolutionary econ./ Does the venture/spinn-off
Intraorganizational further organizational 
ecology learning?
Bundle of projects Team-theory How does the information 
structure of the firm 
influence the probabilities 
of acceptance of  
projects/ventures?
                    
8 Ten years ago, Richard Rumelt (1987: 138) observed that “...it would be good to have more
precise understanding of the types of structural and contractual arrangements that facilitate or
impede entrepreneurial activity”. Our emphasis on contracts, incentives and information
structures may be seen as a partial response to this.
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Bundle of specific Transaction costs Do we possess the com-
and governance heory/incomplete plementary assets that are
mechanisms contracts necessary for commerciali-
zing the fruits of the 
venture?
Bundle of contracts Principal/agency Are incentives adequate to
and incentives theory produce a steady flow of 
new ventures?
____________________________________________________________________________________
Before we begin the more analytical discusson, it is necessary to state
and restate a number of underlying assumptions:
1. Ventures are somehow separated from the main line of business (e.g.,
spatially).  This separation is normally necessary due to the forces of
dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), which may easily kill new ideas
and efforts (if the dominant logic is oriented towards the development of
mainframes, this may kill ideas that are related to PCs).
 
2. Ventures are a) risky, b) unpredictable (in the sense that not all future
contingencies associated with the venture can be foreseen), c) long-term and
multi-stage, d) labor intensive, and e) idiosyncratic in the sense that there are
substantial information costs of comparing venture projects to other
(venture) projects (cf. Holmström, 1989).
 
3. There are venture managers who will often act as champions, that is,
individuals who will try to affect some change in the organization.  Their
motivations are a mix of personal gratification from running their own
project, improved career possibilities, expected direct bonuses if the venture
turns into a success, etc.
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4. Ventures have to be approved of by at least one manager who is higher
placed in the organization than the venture manager.
 
5. Ventures may be analyzed in a three-stages framework, consisting of an idea
generation stage, a development stage and a consolidation state. We
concentrate on the first and the third of these.
 
6. Because of the properties under 2), venture managers are likely to have
private information about the return potential of ventures.
Among other things, these assumptions have the implication that venture
projects cannot be understood as simple investment projects. For example, it
may be unclear what their internal returns are, how they fit with existing
activities, which real options they imply, etc., etc. In the following section, we
discuss such complications in the context of the Elfring, Meeusen-Henniger and
Volberda (1996) framework.
B. Analyzing Corporate Venturing
Generating Ideas for New Ventures
The issue of generating ideas for new ventures implies several sub-issues. For
example, there is the issue of generating the right amount of new ideas, and
there is the issue of generating the right kind of new ideas.
In an evolutionary economics/intra-organizational ecology context, the
creation of new ventures amounts essentially to the creation of new variation,
and spin-offs amounts to a reduction of variation.  As contributions to these
streams of thought recognize, an important aspect of the variation generating
mechanisms is organization structure (Marengo, 1995). For example, it has been
argued that new ventures should be separated from the main line of business:
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to help new ideas blossom, they need to be unburdened by the organization’s
past successes, commitments, cognitive constructs,9 incentive structures,
information channels and routines. Spatial separation may be one mechanism
to help safeguarding the creation of diversity. A second mechanism to promote
the generation of new ideas is to rely on a  bottom-up mechanism: Those who
are close to the markets or the technologies should be able to come forward
with new perceived opportunities, and top-management should be willing to
enter into a learning process with respect to new the venture proposals
(Prahalad, Doz and Angelmar 1989). A third mechanism is simply to institute a
large degree of freedom (in terms of work hours) to experiment, for example,
as in the practice in much technology management where researchers can
spend, say, 15 per cent of their time on their own projects
One problem with these mechanisms is that while they may stimulate
diversity, and perhaps bring the firm closer to an optimal
exploitation/exploration trade-off, there is no guarantee that the right kind of
ideas are being generated.10 It is, of course, in the nature of things that what is
the right kind of idea is hard to tell ex ante, and sometimes ideas that seemed
initially completely unrelated to the firm’s capabilities, resources, and cognitive
constructs may turn out ex post to have been important agents for change and
corporate renewal. But venture managers that are concerned about their careers
may nevertheless be sensitive to higher-level managerial pressure to not put
forward too many too unorthodox ideas.  Thus, we may suggest the following
proposition:
                    
9  When we talk about “cognitive constructs” here and in the following, we intend this to refer
to a diverse range of concepts such as “culture”, “dominant logic”, “managerial heuristics”,
etc.
10 This suggests that we really need a more fine-grained analysis of what “exploration” means.
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Proposition 1: There may be a strong bias in favor of venture ideas that are
“close in” to the firm’s existing base of resources, capabilities and cognitive
constructs. In this case, too little exploration is produced.
In fact, as long as a firm is successful, there may not be much incentive to
introduce changes or to initiate internal ventures which differ from the
successful core business (Levinthal and March, 1993). The generation and
introduction of new variations will often be triggered by declining
performance.
Sometimes a change in top management due to weak performance
results in an increase in diversity, as new top-managers bring in new people,
new ideas and other criteria to judge new perceived opportunities.  This
reactive pattern is, however, not always successful, since often it comes too late
to redress the declining trend.  A main question must therefore be how to move
from a reactive to a proactive policy concerning variation generating
mechanisms.
There are different ways to achieve such an objective. One is a
committing strategy of open’ness to new ideas and willingness to experiment a
bit. This approach assumes that management is capable of distancing
themselves from the dominant logic while judging new venture proposals.
Another mechanism that may support the generation of new ventures is
the presence of a corporate entrepreneurship culture. One aspect of such a
culture is the incentive system designed to stimulate intrapreneurship (Jones
and Butler, 1992). We take a look at this in the following paragraphs, drawing
on principal/agent theory.
In the basic principal/agent model, the risk-neutral principal (manager)
is unable to observe what the risk-averse agent (venture manager) does, but he
can observe (and write a contract over) the outcome of the agent’s efforts
17
(which are costly to the agent). However, this outcome is also influenced by a
stochastic variable (the mean and variance of which principal and agent may
have the same, correct knowledge), so that there is a stochastic project return.
The principal’s inability to observe the agent’s effort is what gives rise to the
incentive problem.  A contract that specifies payment to the agent in term of the
outcome only solves the incentive problem, but not the problem of risk
allocation. The design problem essentially is to encourage effort without overly
burdening the agent with risk. The solutions to the problem conform to
intuition: the agent’s share is larger, the lower is his risk aversion, the risk of
the project, and the agent’s cost of action.
Proposition 2 (Principal/agent): Assuming a positive relation between the
number of venture ideas and the efforts of venture managers, there will be
more venture ideas, the higher is the agent’s share (pecuniary, reputational)
in the project, and the lower his risk aversion, the risk of the project and his
cost of action.
One way to make the basic model richer is to introduce some monitoring
variable, which is a signal that may allow the principal to infer something
about the agent’s real effort (for example, it could be the agent’s efforts under
other projects). Typically, the more risky a project is, the more monitoring on
the part of the principal is needed.  This is because the more risky a project is
(and therefore the more risky the agent’s payment), the less effort a risk-averse
agent will mobilize. He would therefore need to be more closely monitored.
Since new venture projects are much more inherently risky than standard
investment projects, this would seem to call for much more monitoring than in
the case of standard projects.
To the extent that this is not what is observed, this may be because the
firm implicitly trades off the higher incentive and monitoring costs associated
with a venture project against its potentially higher returns (Holmström, 1989).
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However, the other side of the coin is, of course, that more risky projects may
be suppressed precisely because of their known high incentive and monitoring
costs (whereas the future returns are uncertain). Moreover, because letting the
agent work with similar or overlapping projects provides the principal with
better signals for inferring his real effort (Milgrom and Holström, 1991), there
may be a strong tendency to promote similar venture projects and suppress
novel types of venture projects.
Proposition 3 (principal/agent): Because of the risk properties of venture
projects, and the resulting high incentive and monitoring costs, there may be
a tendency to conservatism in idea generation: agents are basically only
allowed to work with a narrow set of ideas, and too dissimilar ideas are
suppressed.
Thus, we find that basic principal/agent considerations is a force pushing
towards conservatism, specifically too little production of variation, to many
new ideas that are too similar. Of course, this is merely a
mechanism/tendency that may be counteracted by managerial action. For
example, the best of all worlds is the one in which management succeeds in
creating an entrepreneurial culture that both keeps agency problems at bay and
promotes a willingness to experiment.11 12 However, not all firms are blessed
                    
11 This is hard to interpret in the context of principal/agent theory, because this theory takes
preferences as given, and organization culture is very much about influencing preferences and
not just incentives.
12 This idea to stimulate employees to seize opportunities may be more easily realized in a
proactive learning environment. The Miller and Chen (1994) study gives some clues on how to
shape a proactive learning environment. They made a distinction between reactive and
proactive learning. The former is based on rewards and punishments, and often poor
performance signaled the need to act. Proactive learning is motivated not by performance
problems or crisis but by provocative information, market diversity, and the desire to realize
opportunities. Such proactive learning is driven by the forces that inspire rather than threaten
managers to act. Diversity in markets or customers can be a route resulting in a wide number
of opportunities. The openness of top management (Burgelman, 1996), and its ability to
provoke, or, in the terms of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993), to shake up the established status quo
may alert and inspire managers to seize those opportunities.
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with such a management (or culture), and many firms must reckon on
incurring substantial agency costs in connection with their exploration efforts.
Another solution is the one employed by 3M.  Top management sets an
overall goal that, for example, the company’s existence depends on whether
in 5 years time 25 per cent of the turnover will come from products which are
presently not in the portfolio.  This puts pressure on the intrapreneurs to
search for new opportunities and also commits management to funnel the
funds to finance the internal venturing process.  It is somewhat akin to the
joint forcing contract discussed in Holmström (1982), where all team members’
full effort is necessary for anybody being paid.
In the context of agency problems, further complications are introduced
when managerial mobility is explicitly allowed for (cf. Rumelt, 1987: 153-154).
If venture managers maximize the present value of their future earnings, and
there is a probability that a part of these earnings will be obtained later in
other firms, a venture manager’s representation of the earning potential of his
venture may be twisted by his ability to leave the firm in favor of other firms if
his excessive representation of the earnings potential of a venture does not live
up to expectations.  This may bias venture ideas in favor of ideas with short-
run gains and long-run losses, because venture managers hope for personal
advantages associated with early gains and reckon on being able to leave the
firm in the case of later losses.
Proposition 4 (principal/agent): Because venture managers are mobile,
there is a tendency towards  generating venture ideas that have a
bias towards short-term gain and long-term losses.
The upshot of this section essentially is that both the number and the nature of
new venture ideas are influenced by considerations that relate to both
principal/agent theory and to theories that stress more evolutionary and
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knowledge-based aspects of firms. Moreover, the two sets of theories allow us
to identify a fundamental trade-off associated with the generation of new ideas
for ventures:
Proposition 5 (modified exploration/exploitation trade-off): While the
creation of diversity/variation through new venture ideas may be
conducive, and even necessary, for long-run survival, intra-
organizational variety creation is unavoidably associated with
agency costs.
Thus, organizational learning through experimentation is inherently costly, not
just because it is in the nature of things that not all new ideas can be profitably
used by the firm, but also because of the agency costs that are inherent in the
process.
Selecting among ventures
As we have seen, there are several reasons why the wrong amount and the
wrong kind of ideas for new ventures may be produced. Intuitively, the later
process of selecting among ventures may produce further harm. Basically, two
mistakes may be committed here: wrongly promoting a malign venture or
wrongly rejecting a beneficial venture.  However, the process may also be
beneficial, first, in the sense that it selects in favor of the right venture, and,
second, in the sense that it selects away malign venture ideas, for example,
those that do not harmonize with the firm’s underlying resources, capabilities
and cognitive constructs. In this case, the managerial act of selecting against
such a venture may lead to a beneficial spin-off, for example, by frustrated,
overruled venture managers.
Evidently, top management has an important role in creating, shaping
and influencing the selection environment. They can intervene directly by
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deciding on the approval or disapproval of proposed internal ventures; this is
the role of judge.
Top management’s indirect influence is important as well: they have the
ability to establish or change the rules, procedures and culture which constitute
the selection mechanisms to help better sorting out the most promising venture
proposals. In this case, the role of top management is not one of judge but
rather a more limited one, that of orchestrator (Galbraith, 1982) of the selection
environment.  For example, management may decide on the “organizational
architecture” that is used in connection with evaluating venture ideas.
Following Sah and Stiglitz (1985) and Sah (1991), consider a team-
theoretic set-up (so that we suppress all incentive problems) with two stylized
selection environments consisting of two organizational architectures, a
“hierarchy” and a “polyarchy”. Each consists of two managers. In the hierarchy, a
venture idea is first evaluated by a lower-level manager,  and if he approves of
the idea, it is evaluated by a higher-level manager who has the final decision on
rejection or acceptance. In a polyarchy, a manager can reject or accept a venture
idea independently of the other managers.  The managers can basically commit
two types of mistakes: they can reject a good project or they can accept a bad
project.
In this simple setting, suppose the two managers have the same
probabilities of accepting a given project, that is to say, the same probability of
committing mistakes. Then, a polyarchy will accept a larger fraction of all types
of ventures, bad ones and good ones. This is because the managers in a
polyarchy together have a larger probability of accepting any given project than
either of the two alone. In a hierarchy, the situation is the opposite. Which one
of these two architectures is most profitable depend on the nature of the
projects they are evaluating and on the managers’ probabilities of committing
mistakes. For example, if a manager’s approval of a bad venture idea is a less
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frequent problem than its rejection of a good venture idea, then a polyarchy is
more profitable, because obviously it will then pay to give the venture ideas a
second chance (as in a polyarchy) rather than giving it a second hurdle (as in a
hierarchy).
 Now, consider these ideas in the context of the characterization we have
given of venture projects as a) risky, b) unpredictable (in the sense that not all
future contingencies associated with the venture can be foreseen), c) long-term
and multi-stage, d) labor intensive, and e) idiosyncratic in the sense that there
are substantial information costs of comparing venture projects to other
(venture) projects. Given these characteristics, it seems reasonable to suppose
that an individual manager, who has to approve or reject a given venture
project, will exhibit a high probability of rejection of good venture projects.
This implies that a hierarchy (in the sense used here) may be a too harsh
selection environment.
Proposition 6: The selection of new ventures is sensitive to how the process
of approval or rejection is organized. Specifically, a hierarchical system of
approval and rejection may suppress too many new venture projects. 
There is indeed evidence (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996) that in order to
counteract this tendency, firms in high-tech environments have back-up
mechanisms: When a venture proposal is being rejected by a higher-level
manager, the venture manager can go somewhere else within the firm, for
example, to another division (this is possible when the charters for division are
flexible) or to an internal venture capital group that may finance projects which
are denied funding by their division managers.
Consolidation
In the consolidation phase, it is assumed that most malign ventures have been
selected against.  Thus, in this stage the central questions are: Is it still
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worthwhile (given our increased knowledge about the venture) to keep the
venture, and if so, how to integrate it into the main line of business, and if not,
how to spin it off.  As research in evolutionary economics (Marengo, 1995) has
clarified, it is not just important to generate new intra-organizational variation;
the new knowledge also has to somehow be absorbed by the rest of the
organization.  In evolutionary terms, this issue has to do with the mechanism of
retention.
According to Miner (1994), the crucial concept underlying the retention
process is that of consistency.  Management seeks to maintain consistency
between the content of the venture proposals and their strategic vision of the
future of the firm. When ventures possess sufficient relatedness to the other
activities of the firm, they become candidates to be integrated. However, if new
ventures are too close to these, the firm will not learn from the venture; it will
simply be an incremental addition to already existing ongoing learning
processes (Prahalad, Doz, and Angelmar, 1989).
On the other hand, as research on diversification from resource-based
and evolutionary perspectives (e.g., Teece et al., 1994) has clarified, ideas that
stretch learning domains (existing organizational learning as it relates to
markets, products and technologies) too much are malign: they simply don’t
mesh with the resource, capabilities and cognitive constructs of the firm. The
logic may be cast in terms of information costs (cf. Casson, 1997): because of
differing cognitive frames, it is costly for venture managers and other agents
involved in the new venture idea, to communicate the idea and therefore also
its return potentials. In fact, much of the relevant knowledge may be tacit,
which further adds to the information costs of transmitting and digesting
knowledge about the new idea.
Proposition 7 (evolutionary/resource-based): Ideas for new ventures should
lie within the right learning domain, that is, not too far away and not too
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close to the firm’s existing resources, capabilities, and cognitive frames.
Ventures that are outside the right learning domain should be spun off.
What is “the right learning domain” may, however, depend on the specific firm
(Christensen and Foss, 1996). Relatively unrelated ventures can lead to a
favorable strategic change of the company as they are integrated (see
Burgelman (1994) on Intel).13  Spinning off such a venture is clearly what we
have called a “vicious” spin-off. We pursue these implications further in the
next section.
IV. Implications for Spin-Offs
The importance of internal corporate venturing for strategic renewal has often
been noticed. Bottom-up processes and autonomous strategic initiatives create
diversity in the initial stages of the venturing process. A selection process
characterized by intrafirm competition, peer review and retrospective
sensemaking from the top creates the opportunities for firms to adapt without
relying on extraordinary foresight of corporate executives. Under particular
circumstances the successful ventures can act as agents for renewal.
In this paper we have conceptualized the internal venturing process (and
also the spinning-off of ventures) as phenomena that relate to the periphery of
the firm.14 Internal ventures are viewed as experiments, and from a bundle or
                    
13 To incorporate strategic renewal, Christensen and Foss (1996) develop the concept of
dynamic corporate coherence, which they see as the capacity to exploit and explore synergies
or new combinations from competences and strategic assets.
14 The idea to conceptualize a firm consisting of two distinct but changing parts has been put
forward in the literature by economists (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) as well as by
organization theorists (Singh, House and Tucker, 1986). The former, associated with the
resource-based approach, stresses the idiosyncratic, synergistic, inimitable, and non-
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“swarm” of experiments a number of successful ventures emerge. From the
“swarm” of venture start-ups, only a limited number will be successful.
Moreover, in practice only one or two of these are chosen as renewal agents. A
number of successful ventures will be scrapped or deprived of sufficient
resources in the development, selection and even in the consolidation stages.
For example, there may be a managerial perception that the venture proposal is
“out of tune” with the resources, capabilities and cognitive constructs of the
firm. In economic terms, the proposed venture induces too many information
and coordination costs, and may be spun-off for this reason
Moreover, the very organization of the selection process may influence
the rate of spin-offs (as in Proposition 6). For example, in the context of the
framework of Sah and Stiglitz (1985), vicious spin-offs may occur when
beneficial venture ideas are rejected, for example, by a hierarchy (which, we
argued, will often be biased towards this mistake).  Overruled and frustrated
venture managers leave the company with their idea. Clearly, there is a
feedback-loop from the process of venture idea selection to the perceived
incentives of the involved intrapreneurs. However, the nature of this feedback-
loop is certainly not unambiguous.
The first thing to note is that the internal process of survival of the fittest
is usually not a very nice process, and involves much political maneuvering.
There may be negative consequences for the internal entrepreneurial climate
flowing from this process - consequences that will not be felt immediately;
only some time later the number of new venture proposals might be lower due
to lack of intrapreneurs. Moreover, a very harsh selection process that turns
                                                            
contestable character of the intrinsic core of the firm. The capabilities in the core cannot be
duplicated, bought or sold. The periphery of the organization consists of capabilities that are
contestable and may be not unique. The contribution from the organization theory field to the
core-periphery distinction has emphasized the propensity for change. Core changes are
difficult to accomplish and are thought to be more disruptive, while changes in the periphery
can be more easily described by an adaptive process.
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down a lot of venture proposals may influence the internal entrepreneurial
climate in a negative way simply by diminishing the expected personal pay-off
associated with putting forward new venture ideas. These are clearly
mechanisms that hinder corporate renewal through venturing. A number of
potentially successful ventures will be scrapped or deprived of resources - a
process that is typically very frustrating for the involved intrapreneurs. As a
result the entrepreneurial climate may deteriorate and the future number of
venture proposals might substantially drop.
On the other hand, spinning off ventures may not only have negative
incentive consequences.  On the contrary, knowing that the firm provides
overhead in connection with developing new venture ideas, and that one may
later commercialize the venture if its spun off (possibly with the financial
assistance of the “mother” company) may indeed be a forceful incentive to put
forward new venture ideas.  Thus, allowing some venture ideas to blossom and
then spinning out some of the successful ventures seems a proper alternative
for at least two reasons.
First, as already mentioned the option of spinning off may be a good
incentive mechanism for intrapreneurs. This contribution to the incentive
structure of the firm might be of crucial importance to the availability of a
sufficient number of intrapreneurs. And the availability of intrapreneurs, who
are eager to pursue opportunities is considered to be the backbone of variation
generating mechanisms. However, spinning out all successful ventures is no
solution, as some of those ventures might be crucial as agents for renewal.
Therefore it is a fundamental managerial challenge to find the proper rate of
spinning out successful ventures.
Secondly, a firm can learn from failing ventures and spin-offs.  Increased
awareness and understanding of which activities and capabilities that are not
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consistent with the firm’s core competences arguably help to identify the
capabilities which can provide the firm with a competitive advantage and
which activities and capabilities should be added to make this competitive
advantage sustainable. Guarding consistency in order to assure corporate
coherence is an important task for top management, and “failures” of ventures
can be helpful in that process.
However, in these cases, the contribution to renewal of the corporate
core is only indirect, namely through the incentive effect and through the
learning effect.  Moreover, a snag with the incentive effect is in fact that is may
become too attractive to be spun-off: The champions of the successful ventures
may prefer to be spun-off, instead of entering an uncertain (and perhaps less
remunerative) process of integrating and renewing core capabilities. In that
case, the spin-off may be considered vicious, as the venture possibly could have
been a factor contributing to corporate renewal.
To repeat, a crucial issue therefore is how the organization of the whole
process of corporate venturing affects the rate of vicious spin-offs.  We can
distinguish two extreme positions. One of the extremes can be typified as a (or
a number of) top-manager(s) putting restrictions on the sort of venture ideas
that can be tolerated and afterwards examining alternative venture proposals,
choosing those ventures with the highest probability to meet the goals and
finally assuring their implementation. This is basically the classical rational
planning model (Miner, 1994). The opposite extreme is one in which
management encourages variation with almost no control and no direct
involvement in its content.
It is intuitively clear that in the first case the amount of vicious spin-offs
will be substantial. Many venture proposals are turned down, without giving
the intrapreneurs any possibility to undertake some exploratory actions to
check its feasibility. This may substantially harm the incentives of
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intrapreneurs to put forward new venture proposals. Thus, tight control is here
combined with dull incentives.
The opposite extreme may go some way towards solving the incentive
problem; however, because control has been strongly relaxed, it creates new
problems, which might be just as destructive for the future of the firm. Large
cost overruns is one likely problem to appear in the short-term. In the medium-
term, a second problem might arise. This concerns the risk of ending up with a
very diverse and unrelated set of activities.
These two problems are closely related to the issue of autonomy granted
to the venture.  “Autonomy” is here a measure of the formal decision rights
that management concede to the venture.  Obviously, the more autonomy in
this sense, the larger the risks associated with lack of control and the possibility
to end up with a wide array of new technologies or products which do not fit
into the main line of business. On the other hand there are forceful arguments
to grant the venture autonomy. Thus, the venture should not be burdened by
the existing routines and commitments of the core business15. Venture
managers often value autonomy both for its own sake and because it may boost
their reputation and thus the value of their human capital. To the extent that
management is very unfamilar with what the venture is doing, this is a force
pulling towards giving venture managers autonomy (see Aghion and Tirole
1997).
It is clear that a balance has to be found here. The rate of spinning out
successful ventures will be a critical instrument in the realization of a certain
                    
15 The literature is divided about this issue. Day (1990) strongly supports complete autonomy
for new venture initiatives. By contrast, others discovered that failed venture teams did so
because of too much autonomy (Venkataraman, 1992). There are a number of ways to resolve
that issue. Some argue that the degree of autonomy should correspond to the extent a new
venture is a discontinuity from the existing business (Olleros and MacDonald, 1988). However,
this does not really “solve” the control problem and does add the problem of estimating the
degree of discontinuity.
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degree of adaptability or renewal of the firm on the one hand and creation of
sufficient incentives for intrapreneurs to pursue opportunities on the other
hand.
V.  Concluding Comments
In this paper we have discussed the role of internal corporate venturing and
spin-offs as means to corporate renewal.  Using reasoning derived from
organizational economics, we have argued that firms may be liable to produce
both the wrong amount and the wrong types of venture ideas, and that the net
effect of this may in practice often be that the exploration/exploitation trade-off
tips in favor of exploitation.
Moreover, we have also been able to put forward some new ideas on
spin-offs. The conventional view is that spin-offs of internal ventures and
management buy-outs are the result of mistakes in the past, due to inadequate
strategies and inappropriate governance. Our more positive interpretation of
these spin-offs is related to the underlying notion of a “swarm” of ventures and
the selection of the most favorable ones on the basis of actual results. In an
uncertain world, it is very difficult to ex ante assess the future results of
innovative ventures. It might be necessary to go ahead with the venture and to
monitor the initial results. Those results may give some indication of the
potential benefits of the venture. From the “population” of venture start-ups a
limited number will be successful. Of the successful ventures only few are
selected out to be able to renew the core of the firm. They can act as agents for
renewal.
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